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INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC 
NORTHWEST: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL 
INTERVENTION 
Brian Richard Ott* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the days before European explorers discovered the New World, 
abundant supplies of fish existed throughout the waterways of the 
Pacific Northwest. Every stream and river served as a spawning 
ground for large numbers of salmon and steelhead trout. 1 These fish, 
commonly described as anadromous,2 supplied a base for the complex 
Indian economies existing in the region. Because spawning runs 
occur at predictable intervals over precise waterways,3 the tribes 
were able to harvest millions of pounds of salmon and steelhead trout 
annually.4 The tribes preserved the captured fish for later use by 
drying or smoking, thereby insuring a steady year-round food sup-
*Citations Editor, 1986-1987, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS 
OF THE NISQUALLY, PUYALLUP, AND MUCKLE SHOOT INDIANS 148 (1970), [hereinafter UN-
COMMON CONTROVERSY]. An early settler commented "The waters of the Bay and all the 
streams that flow into it, are well stocked with fish. Salmon of several varieties abound, and 
are taken in great numbers by the Indians for their own food or for trading with the whites." 
Id. Archeological evidence indicates that Indian fishing has existed on the Columbia River 
System for 6,000 years. Comment, State Pawer and the Indian Treaty Right to Fish, 59 
CALIF. L. REV. 485 (1971). 
2 Anadromous fish are marine species which hatch in the gravel beds of fresh water streams 
and migrate to the open ocean where they mature into adults. After three to five years the 
lifecycle is completed when the fish return to fresh water to spawn. Six species of anadromous 
fish exist in the Pacific Northwest. Five are salmon-the chinook, coho, sockeye, pink, and 
chum or dog, while one is an anadromous variety of rainbow trout, the steelhead. Brief for 
Petitioners, Washington State, at 15-16, Washington v. Washington Comm'l Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
3 The anadromous species have a homing instinct, allowing them to return to their natal 
stream. UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 148. 
4 It is estimated that the tribes took 18 million pounds of salmon annually from the Columbia 
River system before the White man's arrival. Id. at 4 n.3. 
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ply.5 Further, the preserved fish were an important trading com-
modity. Salmon was traded in high volume over an extensive geo-
graphic region. 6 The Northwest Indians bartered the preserved meat 
for lumber, blankets, vermilion, ceremonial masks, and other valu-
able items. 7 Later they exchanged the fish for kettles and guns from 
European explorers. 8 
Along with their economic importance, the anadromous species 
served as the focal point for Indian culture. Social cohesion within 
the loosely-knit tribal groups was founded on the harvest. Every 
member of the community had a specific harvesting function. While 
men caught the fish using weirs, spears, and dip nets, the women 
cleaned and smoked them. Children gathered fire wood and helped 
clean fish. 9 
Each community, in turn, was identified by its traditional fishing 
grounds. 10 Detailed procedures developed to prevent pollution of the 
streams and allow spawning to occur.11 Elaborate religious ceremo-
nies sought to insure the perpetual return of the fish.12 Even the 
Indians' interpretation of constellations had fishing themes. 13 So vital 
were fish to the Indian way of life that one jurist described them as 
"not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the 
atmosphere they breathed. "14 
The Indian's way of life, however, was forever altered when the 
white man began his inexorable push into the Pacific Northwest. 
The earliest permanent white presence was fur trading posts, set 
up in the early eighteenth century to exploit the large beaver and 
otter populations. Protestant and Catholic missionaries arrived 
shortly thereafter in an attempt to convert the tribes to Christianity. 
By 1843, the Great Emigration brought hundreds of white settlers 
into the region. Within ten years, these settlers organized Oregon 
and Washington as separate territories of the United States. As 
more and more settlers entered the area, pressure soon mounted on 
the federal government to extinguish existing Indian land claims. To 
5 From 80 to 90 percent of the Northwest Indians' diet consisted of salmon. [d. at 4. 
5 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 14, Washington v. Washington State Comm'l 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
7 [d. at 13. 
B [d. 
9 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 5. 
10 [d. at 6. 
11 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 12, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
12 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 4. 
13 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 12, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
14 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
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accomplish this task, the United States authorized Isaac Stevens, as 
both governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Washing-
ton territory, to negotiate treaties on its behalf with the various 
tribes. 
Stevens arrived in the Washington territory in 1853. During ne-
gotiations that commenced soon after his arrival, Stevens discovered 
that, while the Indians recognized that the white man's growing 
presence required them to sell much of their homeland, they des-
perately sought to retain their traditional fishing grounds. 15 Indeed, 
the government negotiators recognized that preserving the right to 
fish was indispensable to the conclusion of any treaty with the Pacific 
Northwest Indians. 16 As one treaty negotiator said, "[T]hey [the 
Indians] require the liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in 
their proper season, roots, berries, and fish, where those articles 
can be found."17 
Eager to placate the signatory tribes, Stevens repeatedly assured 
the Indians that a treaty would preserve their fishing rights. His 
statement to the Indians negotiating the Treaty of Point-No-Point 
epitomizes this fact: 
Are you not my children and also children of the Great Father? 
What will I not do for my children, and what will you not for 
yours? Would you not die for them? This paper is such as a man 
would give to his children and I will tell you why. This paper 
gives you a home. Does not a father give his children a home 
.... This paper secures your fish? [sic] Does not a father give 
food to his children?18 
Similarly, Stevens encouraged a reluctant Nez Perce Chief during a 
signing ceremony by declaring, "Looking Glass knows that he can 
... catch fish at any of the fishing stations. "19 
Along with the Indian insistence upon retaining customary fishing 
grounds, other barriers impeded the negotiations. Foremost among . 
these was language. Most of the Indians did not speak English. As 
a result, the negotiations were conducted in Chinook jargon, a simple 
language of limited vocabulary primarily used for barter transac-
15 See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 906 (D. Or. 1969). 
16 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 21. 
17 Brief of Petitioners, Washington State, at 46, Washington v. Washington State Comm'l 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
18 Appendix, at 330-31, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983), quoting Documents Relating to 
the Negotiation of the Treaty of Point-No-Point, January 26, 1855. 
19 Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 906 n.l, quoting Record of Proceedings, Walla Walla Valley 
Treaty Council, June 9, 1855, p. 145. 
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tions. 20 The language proved to be ill-suited to the task. 21 It lacked 
words for such essential terms as "common," "usual," "accustomed," 
"citizens," and "steelhead."22 Furthermore, a vast majority of Indi-
ans present did not even understand Chinook jargon; interpreters 
had to translate the negotiations into tribal languages. 23 
Despite the problems associated with the negotiations, Stevens 
concludeq ten treaties within the space of one year.24 The treaties, 
involving over 17,000 Indians, extinguished Indian land claims to 
more than one hundred thousand square miles of territory.25 In 
return, the Indians received monetary payments and express gov-
ernment recognition of certain reserved rights. Two of these re-
served rights are significant. First, the Indians reserved small par-
cels of land for their exclusive use--what are commonly known as 
reservations. Second, each treaty contained a provision securing 
traditional fishing rights. For example, Article III of the Treaty of 
Medicine Creek states: "The right of taking fish, at all usual and 
accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, 
in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting tempo-
rary houses for the purpose of curing . . . .26 
For some time after the signing of the treaty, little controversy 
arose from this provision. The number of white settlers were small 
and anadromous fish harvests remained bountiful. By the beginning 
of the twentieth century, however, the supply of harvestable fish 
dwindled. 27 Many factors caused this decline. New fishing devices, 
20 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 23. 
21 As one of Stevens' peers commented, "Of course it was utterly impossible to explain the 
treaties to them [the Indians] in Chinook." UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 23, 
quoting MEEKER, PIONEER REMINISCENCES, 208. 
22 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 17, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
23 Brief of Petitioners, Washington State, at 34, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
24 The ten treaties are: Treaty with the Flathead, July 16, 1855, United States-Flathead, 
Kootenay, and Upper Pend d'Oreilles Tribes, 12 Stat. 975; Treaty of Olympia, July 1, 1855, 
United States-Qu-nai-elt and Qui-leh-ute Tribes, 12 Stat. 971; Treaty with the Tribes of 
Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, United States-Walla Walla and Wascoe Tribes, 12 Stat. 963; 
Treaty with the Nez Perce, June 11, 1855, United States-Nez Perce Tribe, 12 Stat. 957; 
Treaty with the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, United States-Yakima Nation, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty 
with the Walla Wallas, June 9, 1855, United States-Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umtilla Tribes, 
12 Stat. 945; Treaty of Neah Bay, Jan. 31, 1855, United States-Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939; 
Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26,1855, United States-S'Klallams Tribe, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty 
of Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, United States-Dwamish and Suquamish Tribes, 12 Stat. 927; 
and Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 6, 1854, United States-Nisqually Tribe, 10 Stat. 1132. 
26 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 19. 
26 Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 6, 1854, United States-Nisqually Tribe, art. 3, 10 Stat. 
1132, 1133 (1854). 
2:1 In the four year period from 1913 to 1916, the average commercial catch exceeded 15 
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such as pound nets and fish wheels, enabled non-Indian fishermen 
to take unprecedented numbers of fish. The perfection of modern 
canning techniques allowed salmon to reach distant markets, causing 
demand to skyrocket.28 Logging operations, a major economic activ-
ity throughout the Northwest, choked waterways with sedimenta-
tion and erosion run-off.29 Diversion of streams for irrigation dried 
up spawning beds,30 and water pollution in the form of sewage and 
agricultural fertilizers deprived the fish of needed oxygen. 31 
The greatest cause of decline, however, was the building of a series 
of dams on the Columbia river system. These dams eradicated 
spawning beds on 1,100 miles of river and tributaries. 32 They also 
created tremendous passage problems for the fish. While fish ladders 
and other means provide a passageway around most dams,33 each 
dam still claims an estimated fifteen to thirty percent of all fish 
attempting to pass.34 In addition, dams alter the river in a manner 
detrimental to the spawning process. The backup of water behind a 
dam increases its temperature and deprives the salmon and steel-
head of dissolved oxygen.35 Because the anadromous species have 
an exceedingly low tolerance for alterations in their environment, 
these changes will often severely impair or kill the fish. 36 
In an attempt to halt this decline in the fish stocks, the affected 
state governments37 have enacted comprehensive resource manage-
ment plans, intended to have universal applicability. The Indian 
million fish annually. Between 1964 and 1967, this same figure dropped to less than 3 million. 
See UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 71. 
28 In 1866, while packing techniques and fishing devices were unsophisticated, the total non-
Indian output consisted of 4,000 pounds. Twenty years later, the output had ballooned to 
approximately 30,000,000 pounds. Comment, Empty Victories: Indian Treaty Fishing Rights 
in the Pacific Northwest, 10 ENVTL. L. 413, 419 (1980) [hereinafter EMPTY VICTORIES]. 
29 Id. at 421 n.5I. 
so UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 158. 
31 Id. at 161. 
32 I d. at 156. 
33 Some dams, however, such as the Grand Coulee, provided no means of passage. As a 
result, the runs on the upper Columbia were obliterated. Id. at 155 . 
.. EMPTY VICTORIES, supra note 28, at 421 n.47, quoting E. CHANEY, A QUESTION OF 
BALANCE: WATERIENERGy-SALMON AND STEELHEAD PRODUCTION IN THE UPPER COLUM-
BIA BASIN, SUMMARY REPORT 6 (1978). 
35 UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 1, at 158. 
36 See id. 
37 Four states on the Pacific Coast have significant spawning runs on anadromous fish on 
their waterways: California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska. While all four have experienced 
problems conserving their anadromous resources, most of the litigation concerning Indian 
fishing rights has centered in Washington and Oregon. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, 
any general reference to states or state governments are meant to indicate Washington and 
Oregon. 
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tribes, in turn, have claimed exemption from the regulations, based 
on the wording of the treaty provisions and the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution. The resulting controversy has 
been heated and, at times, violent.38 Part II of this Comment will 
layout the legal context of the dispute. Part III will outline the 
opposing arguments. Part IV will analyze the federal judiciary's 
handling of the dispute, and Part V will argue that federal legislative 
and administrative intervention is necessary in order to achieve a 
permanent solution. 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE CONTROVERSY 
A. The Legal Relationships 
An analysis of the Indian fishing rights dispute may best be per-
formed by first defining the legal relationships existing between the 
three principal characters: the federal government, the Indian 
tribes, and the state government. Of these, the relationship between 
the federal government and the Indian tribes is the most distinc-
tive. 39 The relationship is premised on the broad power, often de-
scribed as plenary, which the United States holds over Indian tribes. 
The source of this power is an amalgam of several constitutional 
provisions, most notably the Indian Commerce Clause,40 the Treaty 
Clause,41 and the Property Clause.42 Taken together, these provi-
sions enable the national government to exercise comprehensive 
38 A federal district court judge was hung in effigy and received death threats after the 
announcement of his decision concerning the controversy. Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis 
and Off-Reservation Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REV. 61, 92 n.l68 (1975-76). Wide-
spread vandalism was also reported. See generally S. Rep. No. 667, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6793. 
39 Chief Justice Marshall, in Cherokee Nation V. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), noted 
that "[tlhe condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of 
any other two people in existence .... [Tlhe relation of the Indians to the United States is 
marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else." Id. at 16. 
40 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has authority to "regulate Commerce ... with 
the Indian Tribes" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This provision gives the federal government exclusive 
power to enter treaties. In 1851, however, Congress prohibited the government from entering 
into treaties with the Indian tribes. 16 Stat. 544, 566, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982). As a result, the 
importance of this provision as a source of federal power has diminished. 
42 The Property Clause allows Congress to control "Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This provision is relevant because the 
United States holds ultimate fee title in all Indian lands. See infra notes 72-77 and accom-
panying text. At one time, the war powers of Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cIs. 1, 11, 
12, 15-17, were also an important source of federal power over the Indian tribes. 
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control over many aspects of Indian life. For example, Congress may 
validly regulate any commercial transaction involving Indians, either 
individually or as a tribal unit,43 it may regulate and dispose of Indian 
property without consent,44 and it may freely alter the tribal power 
of self-government. 45 
Despite its characterization as plenary, federal power over the 
Indian tribes is not absolute. It has been subject to limitations, the 
greatest of which flows from the federal government's trust respon-
sibility. Because Indian tribes have historically been considered de-
pendents of the United States,46 the federal-tribal relationship has 
been considered similar to that which exists between a ward and his 
guardian. 47 As a result, the national government owes a special 
fiduciary duty to the tribes. This obligation contains many of the 
characteristics of a legally enforceable private trust. For example, 
it requires the United States, as trustee, to advance the best inter-
ests of the beneficiary tribes. In Manchester Band of Pomo Indians 
v. United States, a federal district court determined that the United 
States had not acted in the best interests of the plaintiff Indian band 
when it placed tribal trust funds in investments yielding less than 
the market rate of interest. 48 As a result, the court required the 
government to pay the difference between the return which a rea-
sonably prudent trustee would have gained and the actual return. 49 
As a corollary to the principle of acting in the best interests of its 
guardian, the trust responsibility requires the government to sub-
ordinate its own interests to those of the Indian tribes. In Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, an Interior Department regulation 
allowing diversion of river water for a federal irrigation project was 
struck down because it would adversely affect an Indian tribe living 
43 E.g., United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 417-18 (1866). The full extent of 
federal authority over Indian commerce is displayed in the Indian liquor law cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908). 
44 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903). Compensation may be required 
for the exercise of this power. See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 208 U.S. 476 (1937). 
45 Examples of Congressional usurpation of tribal government include the Major Crimes 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982) which provided the federal government with criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian reservations and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982), 
subjecting official tribal actions to limited judicial review. 
46 "They [the tribes] are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely 
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights." United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 
375, 383-84 (1886) (emphasis in original). 
47 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. 
48 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 197 3). 
49 I d. at 1248. 
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on the shores of a downstream lake. 50 The federal district court noted 
that the Secretary of Interior had abused his discretion by enacting 
the regulation without properly recognizing his fiduciary duties. 51 
Another manifestation of the government's trustee obligation is a 
duty of loyalty. Unless expressly authorized by Congress, the United 
States may not abandon its fiduciary responsibilities. In White v. 
Califano, the federal government attempted to pass the responsi-
bility for Florence Red Dog, a mentally ill member of the Sioux 
tribe, to the state of South Dakota. 52 The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that, since part of the government's fiduciary obli-
gation consisted of maintaining adequate health care on reservations, 
refusal to pay for Red Dog's treatment was an impermissable evasion 
of responsibility. 53 
One final aspect of the United States' trust obligation are the rules 
of treaty construction which the judiciary has imposed upon itself. 
These rules, often described as canons, apply to any judicial inter-
pretation of Indian treaties. First, the treaties must be interpreted 
as the signatory Indians would have understood them, rather than 
in their strict legal sense. 54 Second, because the government had 
enormous advantages in negotiation and diplomacy skills, any am-
biguous terms must be resolved in favor of the Indians. 55 Finally, 
the treaties must be construed in accordance with their objectives. 56 
The federal judiciary has construed the government's fiduciary 
duty to the Indian tribes strictly. For instance, where the federal 
government mistakenly appropriated Creek tribal land due to a 
surveying error, it was required to compensate the tribe at prices 
equivalent to the value of the land at the time of disposition plus 
interest. 57 Similar violations will generally result in either legal or 
equitable relief. 58 Consequently, the United States' trustee status 
60 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. D.C. 1973). 
51 Id. at 256-57. 
52 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978). 
53 Id. at 698. 
54 E.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone 
Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938). 
65 E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter v. 
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). 
56 See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1956); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. at 
381. 
57 United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935). 
58 E.g., Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (injunctive relief granted 
against federal plan to terminate a small Indian community); Coast Indian Community v. 
United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (money damages awarded for government's dis-
position of a right of way across Indian land at below market value). 
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serves as a significant limitation on its plenary power over Indian 
tribes. 
While the federal government has broad authority over the Indian 
tribes, state law has a much more restricted application in tribal 
affairs. Courts faced with the issue of state law applicability have 
distinguished on-reservation activities from those based off the res-
ervation. Regarding on-reservation activities, courts generally fol-
low the traditional rule, laid out in Worcester v. Georgia, which 
immunizes Indian tribes from state regulation. 59 The Worcester rule 
of tribal immunity has been based on two premises. First, the ex-
clusion from state regulation is considered necessary to protect the 
Indian tribes' limited sovereignty.60 Second, Indian affairs have his-
torically been an exclusively federal province not subject to state 
encroachment.61 This doctrine remains vital today.62 For instance, 
when Arizona attempted to impose its individual income tax on 
reservation Indians, the Supreme Court held the tax unlawful. 63 
While some degree of state intrusion has been allowed,64 these ex-
ceptions to the rule are carefully insulated and do not alter the basic 
premise of tribal on-reservation immunity. 
In contrast to the immunity granted to Indians for on-reservation 
activities, off-reservation conduct is subject to normal state author-
59 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, the Supreme Court held a Georgia statute 
prohibiting white settlers from living on Cherokee reservation lands to be void. [d. at 561-
62. 
60 Although the concept of tribal sovereignty has been substantially modified over the course 
of the nation's history, recent Supreme Court cases have reaffinned its vitality. See generally, 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("Indian tribes still possess those aspects 
of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status."); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 547 ("Indian tribes are 
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their 
territory. "). 
61 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. For a history of the federal government's 
relations with the Indian tribes, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 50-
206 (1982 ed.). 
62 See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
63 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973). 
64 For example, if a state obtains tribal consent, Congress has authorized it to assume 
general civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1982). In 
addition, the actions of non-Indians on reservation lands are subject to state laws when they 
relate solely to other non-Indians, N.Y. ex. reI. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946) (state has 
jurisdiction to prosecute the murder of one non-Indian by another on reservation land); 
Langford v. Monteith, 102 U. S. 145 (1880) (service of process by state court allowed on white 
living on reservation land). Finally, where Indian tribes have lost their status as a separate 
entity and have become fully assimilated citizens, state laws are sometimes considered appli-
cable. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598,610 (1943). 
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ity in most circumstances.65 The only major exception to this rule 
lies in specific Indian rights retained in ceded areas. 
The relationship between the federal and state governments, so 
far as it concerns Indians, is controlled by the Supremacy Clause 
and its concept of preemption.66 Application of the principles of 
preemption varies according to the field of law in question. In the 
area of Indian law, however, the Supremacy Clause has been con-
sistently and forcefully applied. 67 Because of the federal govern-
ment's trustee status68 and the Indian tribes' traditional position as 
distinct political sovereigns,69 courts will often invalidate state action 
based only on the general purposes of federal statutes and treaties. 70 
66 E.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 155 (1973) (no immunity from state 
tax for Indian ski resort operated off the reservation land); Organized Village of Kake v. 
Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75-76 (state law prohibiting salmon traps applicable to non-reservation 
Indians absent any contrary treaty provision). 
Each state, as an aspect of its ultimate sovereignty, has broad power to enact legislation 
concerning the health and welfare of its citizens. This power, the so-called police power, has 
long included the ability to regulate the taking of game within state borders. See, e.g., 
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71 (1855). In 
Geer v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut statute forbidding 
the shooting of certain gamebirds for the purpose of transporting them beyond state bound-
aries. 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896). The court supported its decision by citing language of the 
California Supreme Court: "The wild game within a state belongs to the public in their 
collective capacity . . . . [T]hey may, if they see fit, absolutely prohibit the taking of it, or 
traffic and commerce in it, if it is deemed necessary for the protection or preservation, or the 
public good." Id. at 529, quoting Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 483, 37 P. 402, 404 (1894). The 
Supreme Court did overrule Geer in Hughes v. OklahorrUL, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), because the 
regulation involved violated the Commerce Clause. Despite this reversal, Geer's lengthy 
discussion of the state right to regulate wildlife resources retains Validity. For a detailed 
discussion of relevant cases, see Comment, State Regulation of Indian Treaty Fishing Rights: 
Putting Puyallup III into Perspective, 13 GoNZ. L. REV. 140, 150-57 (1977). 
66 According to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the "Laws of the 
United States ... and all Treaties ... made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, § 2. Through resort to this provision, state laws which contradict those of federal 
government are held void. The conflict need not be direct; preemption also exists where 
Congress has demonstrated its intention solely to occupy an entire field and a state attempts 
to legislate in the area. 
67 See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (state of Arizona preempted from exercising 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian general store located just outside reservation land since such 
action would undermine the authority of tribal courts); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 
737 (1867) (land held by Indian tribes immune from state taxation despite the failure of the 
tribes to retain former lifestyle). . 
68 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. 
69 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
70 E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (pervasive nature of 
federal regulation concerning Indian logging activities indicates a Congressional purpose to 
foreclose any state interference); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 
(1973) (state income tax invalid against reservation Indians because the Congressional purpose 
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A clear example occurred in Fisher v. District Court.71 A Montana 
state court acting under authority of state law, conducted an adop-
tion proceeding for I van Firecrow, a young member of the Northern 
Cheyenne tribe. Firecrow's natural mother sought to invalidate the 
proceeding, claiming that a federal statute permitting tribal self-
government preempted application of the state act. The Supreme 
Court agreed, holding that the general purpose of the act was to 
allow the Cheyenne tribe to govern itself independent of state in-
terference. 72 Because application of the state law unlawfully inter-
fered with this purpose, the Court invalidated the adoption proceed-
ing. 73 
B. Aboriginal Title 
The underlying base of any analysis concerning Indian property 
rights is the longstanding doctrine of aboriginal title. This concept 
has its roots in early decisions of the federal judiciary, which rec-
ognized that although European explorers claimed ultimate sover-
eignty over all lands they discovered, the Indian tribes retained a 
subservient interest known as aboriginal or Indian title. 74 Aboriginal 
title, which extends to all lands occupied or used by an identifiable 
tribe since time immemorial, is a possessory interest; it provides the 
tribes holding it with an exclusive right to occupy the land, along 
with the right to take all beneficial incidents of such occupancy. 75 
These beneficial incidents include the right to hunt and fish. 76 
Although aboriginal title provides the Indian tribes with many of 
the benefits of land ownership, broad limitations do exist. Since the 
ultimate fee interest remains with the federal government, the In-
dian tribes may not transfer their interest without Congressional 
approval. 77 The government also retains absolute authority to modify 
or abrogate aboriginal title. 78 Moreover, any abrogation does not 
give rise to a claim for compensation. 79 
in signing the treaty which created the reservation was to establish an area under exclusive 
tribal sovereignty subject to general federal supervision). 
71 424 U.S. 382 (1975). 
72 [d. at 383, 386-89. 
73 [d. at 389. 
74 See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823). 
75 E.g., Shoshone v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496 (1937). 
76 United States v. Minnesota, 466 F. Supp. 1382, 1385. 
77 See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1902); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 
U.S. 517, 525 (1877). 
78 E.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); United States v. Santa 
Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
79 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 284-85. 
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As a result of aboriginal title, the treaty provisions regarding 
Indian fishing did not actually convey any rights to the tribes. In-
stead, they merely acknowledged that the tribes wished to retain 
their pre-existing fishing rights. As the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Winans observed, "[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights 
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of 
those not granted. "80 
III. OPPOSING ARGUMENTS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
A. State Argument 
In claiming that their fishing regulations apply on an equal basis 
to both Indians and non-Indians, the state governments of the Pacific 
Northwest have relied on two essential arguments. First, the gov-
ernments believe that a careful reading of the treaty guarantee itself 
allows them to regulate Indian fishing. Second, beyond any purely 
legal arguments, the states contend that the preservation of the 
anadromous species requires regulation of all user groups, including 
the Indian tribes. 
1. Treaty Language 
On the surface, the language of the treaties seems unequivocal. 
Each treaty contains a provision which secures to the Indians "[t]he 
right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and sta-
tions. "81 This right, however, contains an important qualification. It 
is to be exercised "in common with all citizens of the territory. "82 
The states contend that a plain reading of the phrase mandates that 
equality is to exist between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. Since 
non-Indian citizens are subject to fishing regulations consistent with 
the police power, Indians should be equally affected. Consequently, 
the prohibitions of certain types of gear, the catch limitations, and 
location restrictions, which apply to non-Indian commercial and sport 
fishermen, would also apply to their full extent to Indian fishermen. 
In support of this interpretation of the "in common with" language, 
the Northwest states turn to another place where the same language 
appears. The Treaty with the Yakimas provides that the tribe has 
"the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel 
80 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. 
81 Treaty of Medicine Creek, art. 3, 10 Stat. at 1133. 
82 Id. 
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upon all public highways."83 The states point out that the drafters 
of the treaties clearly desired that the use of highways be equally 
shared among Indians and non-Indians alike with the same police 
power restrictions on both sides. Otherwise, the Indian tribes would 
be allowed to travel on public highways with no regard to the safety 
rules applicable to non-Indians. Therefore, since the "in common 
with" language of the highway provision mandates equal treatment 
of Indians and non-Indians, the states contend that the "in common 
with" language of the fishing rights provision should be interpreted 
similarly in order to maintain consistency. 84 
2. Necessity for Conservation 
Perhaps the states' strongest argument comes from an analysis of 
the effects, both actual and potential, that unimpeded Indian fishing 
would have on conservation efforts. The precipitous decline in salmon 
and steelhead stocks in recent years85 has made management of the 
resource a difficult and exacting chore. Starting when a spawning 
run begins, fish biologists must quickly calculate the run size and 
escapement needs of the species while factoring in such man-made 
influences as dams and water pollution in order to determine the 
maximum catch allowable. Due to the declining numbers of fish, this 
calculation must be extremely accurate. Any mistake may lead to 
overfishing and quick obliteration of the anadromous species.86 
When the Indian tribes are allowed to fish unimpeded by regula-
tion, the states contend that the task of insuring species survival 
becomes very difficult, if not impossible. Any assessment of the 
maximum allowable catch becomes meaningless, since the state has 
no way of enforcing its determination on the tribes. Thus, the whole 
regulatory system, designed to insure species survival, breaks down. 
The effects can be devastating, particularly when traditional tribal 
fishing grounds are located on the upper reaches of river tributaries. 
At such locations, the salmon are very concentrated and often just 
83 Treaty with the Yakimas, art. III, 12 Stat. at 952-53 (emphasis added). 
84 See Brief of Petitioner, Department of Game, at 19, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of 
Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968)(No. 247). 
80 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
86 In 1880, the state of California made mistaken estimates of escapement needs for anad-
romous species. As a result, overfishing nearly eliminated salmon in Southern California. Brief 
of Amicus Curiae, Northwest Steelhead and Salmon Council of Trout Unlimited, at 11, 
Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) 
(No. 77-983). 
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milling in pools, resting or waiting to spawn.87 As a result, a small 
number of Indian fishermen, left unregulated, could remove those 
last remaining fish needed to propagate the species. The Washington 
Department of Fisheries reported that in 1964, a year in which 
Indian fishing went virtually unregulated, only thirty-three spring 
run chinook, less than three percent of the entire run, escaped Indian 
fishing on the Yakima river system.88 In the same year, only seventy-
five chinook escaped to spawning grounds on the Naches River.89 
These statistics, along with a host of others,90 prompted a De-
partment of Interior official to comment, " . . . Indian fishermen, 
particularly Indian commercial fishermen, can seriously imperil or 
even destroy fish runs if they are not subject to some restraint."91 
Consequently, the states argue that the need to preserve the anad-
romous species negates any possible counterargument. 
B. The Indian Claim of Exemption 
In contrast to the state argument that their game regulations 
apply with uniformity, the Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest 
have long claimed immunity from such rules. This belief is based on 
a two-part argument. First, the tribes argue that the effect of the 
treaty guarantee is to prevent state regulation of their rights. Sec-
ond, the Indians contend that in order to maintain consistency with 
the three basic canons of Indian treaty construction, the "in common 
with" language must not be interpreted as a measure of equality 
between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. 
1. The Force and Effect of the Treaties 
The treaties made between Stevens and the Northwest tribes 
extinguished aboriginal title on all lands in the region, save the small 
reservations. Each treaty did, however, preserve and expressly rec-
ognize one important component of aboriginal title: the right to hunt 
87 Testimony of J. E. Lasater, Joint Appendix, at 94-95, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of 
Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (No. 247). 
88 Brief of Amicus Curiae, State of Oregon, at 3, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of 
Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (No. 247). 
89 [d. at 4. 
90 The effects of unimpeded Indian fishing in the Great Lakes are equally as severe. An 
Indian fishery on Whitefish Bay reduced spawning stocks of lake trout by 97 percent between 
1974 and 1979. North Woods Call, Sept. 1, 1982, p. 3, col. 1. 
91 Brief of Amicus Curiae, State of Oregon, at 4, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (No. 247), quoting 
Statement of George Dysart in speech at Congress of American Indians Convention, Oct. 3, 
1967. 
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and fish on traditional tribal grounds. 92 This federal recognition has 
important legal consequences. 93 Perhaps the most important effect 
lies in the protection from state regulation that such a recognized 
right receives. Whereas unrecognized aboriginal hunting and fishing 
rights appear to be subject to state wildlife regulation,94 federal 
recognition insulates Indian hunting and fishing rights from state 
laws through the Supremacy Clause. 95 Under this provision, states 
are restrained from either amending or abrogating federal treaty 
provisons. When state law contradicts federal treaties, the state law 
must yield. In Missouri v. Holland,96 the seminal case under this 
doctrine, the Supreme Court confronted an argument by the state 
of Missouri that a treaty between the federal government and Great 
Britain to protect migratory waterfowl impermissibly interfered 
with the state's own wildlife management. In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court held that while the regulation of wildlife resources 
is clearly encompassed in the state police power, a valid federal 
treaty provision may override this right. 97 
Based on the Supremacy Clause and its interpretation in Missouri 
v. Holland, the Northwest tribes argue that their right to hunt and 
fish is immune to state regulation. After all, the treaties made be-
tween the United States and the Indian tribes have the same force 
and effect as the treaty in Missouri v. Holland. The Supreme Court 
does not draw a distinction between treaties made with Indian tribes 
and those made with foreign nations. 98 In addition, the fishing rights 
provision appears to be as conclusive as the prohibition in Missouri 
v. Holland. In both cases, the Court made no mention of any con-
current state regulation. Hence, the Indians argue that the possi-
bility of state regulation, having been rejected in Missouri v. Hol-
land, should similarly be foreclosed in the present controversy, 
92 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
93 For example, federal recognition of aboriginal rights gives the holder a property right 
which is accorded the same protection against an uncompensated taking as any other property 
right. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968). 
94 See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). In Kake, the Thlinget Indians 
brought suit to enjoin Alaska's threatened enforcement of a statute prohibiting the use of 
salmon traps. The Supreme Court upheld the state's rights to enforce its law. Justice Frank-
furter, in an unanimous opinion, noted that since Congress had not spoken on the issue, the 
state of Alaska has a right to regulate Indian fishing pursuant to its police powers. [d. at 76. 
95 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
96 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
97 [d. at 434. 
98 See United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876); Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
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thereby allowing Indian fishing to exist unimpeded by state regula-
tion. 
2. The "in common with" Provision 
The actual language of the treaties serves as an important obstacle 
to the Indian claim of immunity. The "in common with" clause has 
been seized upon by the Northwest states as requiring an equality 
of treatment between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. 99 In con-
trast, the tribes argue that the phrase merely extends the right of 
fishing, which heretofore had been exclusively Indian, to white set-
tlers.100 In this sense, "in common with" actually means "as well as 
to. "101 Moreover, the Indians argue that their interpretation must 
be accepted in order to maintain consistency with the three basic 
canons of Indian treaty construction. 102 
Regarding the first rule of treaty construction, which states that 
treaties must be interpreted as the signatory tribes would have 
understood them, rather than in their strict legal sense, Indian rights 
advocates argue that the Indians who signed the treaty surely did 
not understand the treaty as allowing for state limitations on their 
right. At the time of signing, natural resources in the Pacific N orth-
west existed in such abundance that no one contemplated future 
shortages. Given the Indians' strong desire to retain their cherished 
fishing rights, however, it seems unlikely that the tribal represen-
tatives would have signed the documents had they forseen limita-
tions. 
As far as the canon that any ambiguous terms be resolved in favor 
of the Indians, the tribes argue that to interpret "in common with" 
according to the state definition would be erroneous. As noted pre-
viously, "in common with" has two inconsistent interpretations. 103 
The states interpret the phrase as a symbol of equality, while the 
tribes believe it merely bestowed fishing rights on white fishermen. 
In such circumstances, this rule of construction obligates courts to 
interpret the clause in a manner favorable to the Indians. 104 
99 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
100 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 130, Washington v. Washington State Comm'l 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
101 Johnson, The State Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme 
Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 207, 213 (1972). 
102 See Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 119, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
103 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, the Indians argue that "in common with" should be con-
strued in favorable terms in order to maintain consistency with the 
treaty objectives, as the third canon mandates. They contend that 
both parties sought to preserve Indian fishing for future generations. 
From the Indian point of view, this contention seems obvious. The 
objective of Governor Stevens and the other white settlers, though, 
was also to preserve Indian fishing. Just as the anadromous fish 
were vital to the Indian tribes, they served as an integral component 
of the pioneer economy.105 The white settlers relied on the salmon 
caught by Indians as an export product and as a ready source of 
food. 106 Indeed, Stevens told the Indians that he wanted to send 
them modern fishing equipment in an attempt to encourage their 
fishing activity.107 It also seems unlikely that the white negotiators, 
realizing that fishing was essential to the Indians, would have cre-
ated the possibility of leaving the tribes with no means of providing 
for their livelihood. Thus, in order to give effect to this objective, 
the Indians argue that the term "in common with" must not be 
interpreted as denoting equality. 
IV. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY 
Although the trustee obligations which the United States has 
towards the Indian tribes seems to mandate affirmative actions to 
protect tribal hunting and fishing rights,108 the federal legislative 
and executive branches have seldom interceded in the controversy. 109 
Consequently, the problem has fallen on the judiciary. The treatment 
of Indian fishing rights claims by federal and state courts has fluc-
tuated greatly over the course of the last century. Early case law 
shows a partiality towards state arguments favoring their wildlife 
regulations. Later cases tend to favor the Indians' arguments, but 
contain dicta which provide strong ammunition for future state ar-
guments. This dicta set the stage for modern case law, which, while 
acknowledging the special status of Indian fishing rights, has sought 
to uphold reasonable state regulation of Indian fishing. 
105 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 127, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
106 [d. at 126. 
107 [d. at 129. 
108 See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text. The administrative branch has intervened 
to bring suit on behalf of the Indian tribes. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 
312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). This action, however, merely passes the controversy on to the 
judiciary. 
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A. The Early Cases 
The earliest Supreme Court case dealing with Indian wild game 
rights is Ward v. Race HorseYo Race Horse, a Bannock tribesman, 
was convicted of killing seven elk on state land in violation of a 
Wyoming game law. He sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming 
immunity under an 1868 treaty which provided that "they [the In-
dians] shall have the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the 
United States ... so long as peace subsists among the Whites and 
Indians on the borders of the hunting districts."111 The Court re-
versed a Court of Appeals decision granting the writ. Justice White, 
writing the majority opinion, concluded that the subsequent 
Congressional action of admitting Wyoming into the Union 
superseded the Indians' treaty right. 112 Because the act terminated 
the hunting districts referred to in the treaty, the Indian hunting 
guarantee no longer had effect. 113 
The Supreme Court again rejected Indian immunity claims in New 
York ex. rel. Kennedy v. Becker.114 Three Seneca Indians were 
arrested for spear fishing on land which the Seneca Nation had ceded 
to Robert Morris, a colonial settler, in 1797. 115 The treaty contained 
a provision reserving the Indians' right to hunt and fish. 116 The Court 
categorized the provision as a privilege, subject to any valid state 
regulation.117 To hold otherwise, the Court concluded, would rob 
N ew York of a necessary incident of its inherent sovereignty. 118 
B. Later Case Law 
Soon after Race Horse, the Supreme Court, in a reflection of the 
white man's more advanced understanding of Indian culture, began 
to accord greater deference to reserved fishing rights. At the same 
lIO 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
111 Treaty with the Shoshones and Bannacks, art. IV, 15 Stat. 673, 674-75 (1868). 
lI2 163 U.S. at 515-16. Wyoming entered the Union in 1890. 26 Stat. 222 (1890). 
liS [d. 
lI' 241 U.S. 556 (1916). 
lI5 [d. at 602. 
lI6 The treaty was subsequently ratified by the Senate. It did not contain the some ''in 
common with" clause of later treaties. 7 Stat. 601 (1797). 
117 241 U.S. at 563-64. 
liB [d. State courts dealing with the dispute soon followed the Supreme Court lead. See, 
e.g., State v. Towessnute, 89 Wash. 478, 481, 154 P. 805, 807 (1916) (court upheld the arrest 
of a Yakima Indian fishing without a license by denying the existence of aboriginal title). See, 
also, People v. Chosa, 252 Mich. 154,233 N.W. 205 (1930). Because of such opinions on both 
the state and federal level, the Indian tribes were routinely denied any degree of immunity 
from state regulation. 
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time, however, the Court did offer important dicta favoring the state 
regulatory powers. The first case of this new current was United 
States v. Winans. 119 The federal government, along with a group of 
Yakima Indians, brought suit to enjoin Winans and other white 
landowners from depriving the Indians of access to their fishing sites. 
Winans contended that the treaty right existed only as long as the 
land remained federally owned, since private landowners gained 
property rights which foreclosed Indian intrusion. 120 Further, the 
landowners, relying on the Race Horse precedent, argued that the 
admission of Washington into the Union superseded the treaty pro-
vision. 121 
The Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments without 
mentioning Race Horse. Regarding the first argument, the Court 
held that the rights reserved to the Indians by the treaties imposed 
a servitude on all affected lands. 122 As far as the second argument, 
the Court limited Race Horse by declaring that the federal govern-
ment has the power to create rights in territories which remain 
binding when the territory becomes a state. 123 The opinion is notable 
for the strong rhetorical support shown Indian fishing rights.124 In a 
peculiar piece of dictum, however, the Court made its first comment 
on the relation between state regulation and a valid treaty reser-
vation. 125 Justice McKenna, in his majority opinion, states, "Nor does 
[the treaty] restrain the State unreasonably, if at all, in the regula-
tion of the right [to fish]."126 This off-hand comment, appearing near 
the end of the opinion, has served as a basis for the Northwestern 
states' position in countless cases. 
The Supreme Court continued to support Indian fishing rights in 
Tulee v. Washington. 127 Sampson Tulee, a Yakima Indian, was con-
119 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
12() Id. at 379. This argument rests on the condition that the property rights gained by the 
white landowners did indeed relate to the Indians on an equal basis as non-Indians. To prove 
this, Winans argued that the treaty clause "in common with the citizens of the Territory" 
meant that Indian and non-Indian fishing rights were to be treated equally. Id. 
121 Id. at 382. 
122 Id. at 381. 
123 Id. at 383. 
124 "The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights 
possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, 
and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere 
they breathed." Id. at 381. 
125 The court determined that the treaty provision involved in Race Horse was abrogated. 
See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
126 198 U.S. at 384. 
127 315 U.S. 681 (1942). 
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victed of violating state game laws by catching salmon without a 
license. He argued that the treaty guaranteed him unimpeded fishing 
rights. The state, in contrast, contended that the "in common with" 
language restricted Indians and whites equally. The Court reversed 
Tulee's conviction, holding that the state had no power under the 
treaty to impose a license fee on Indian fishing for revenue-producing 
purposes. 128 Nonetheless, the Court once again acknowledged in 
dictum that the states were entitled to regulate Indian fishing for 
non-financial purposes: "[T]he treaty leaves the state with the power 
to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions ... of 
a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and manner of fishing 
outside the reservation as necessary for the conservation of fish 
. . . . "129 This "necessary for conservation" standard serves as a 
building block for modern cases dealing with the controversy. 
C. The Modern Cases 
After Tulee, the Supreme Court remained silent on the contro-
versy for twenty-six years. In these intervening years, lower courts 
struggled to apply the Tulee test. A wide range of applications 
resulted. On one extreme was the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in 
State v. Arthur130 which rejected any application of the Tulee stan-
dard at all. David Arthur, a member of the Nez Perce tribe, was 
prosecuted for killing a deer out of season on land ceded to the 
federal government in a treaty. The defense rested with the treaty 
guarantee of the hunting and fishing rights. In its opinion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court, using a Supremacy Clause argument and ignoring 
the "in common with" language altogether, ruled that the Indian 
tribes were entitled to complete immunity from state regulation. 131 
The court, describing the Tulee test as irrelevant dictum, denied its 
applicability. 132 
Although the Arthur decision received some support,133 its ulti-
mate precedential value has been minimal. Other courts were more 
willing to adopt the Tulee test. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals attempted a straightforward application of the test in 
Makah Tribe v. Schoettler.134 The Makah Indians sought injunctive 
128 [d. at 685. 
129 [d. at 684. 
130 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). 
131 [d. at 262-65, 261 P.2d at 141-43. 
132 [d. at 263, 261 P.2d at 142. 
133 E.g., State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513,314 P.2d 400 (1957). 
134 192 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1951). 
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relief against a Washington regulation prohibiting their net and trap 
fishing at traditional grounds on the Hoko River. The state con-
tended that the regulation was necessary to preserve the fall silver 
salmon run and as a result, was valid under Tulee. l35 In addition, 
the state of Washington asserted that any alternative regulation 
would be prohibitively expensive. 136 The Makahs denied that the 
regulation was necessary. They argued that the same conservation 
result could be achieved by a partial stopping of all fishing during 
key periods of the spawning run. 137 Reversing a District Court de-
cision, the Court of Appeals restrained enforcement of the regulation 
against the tribe. l38 Because of the existence of a less burdensome 
alternative regulation, the court found that the state had not met 
the "necessary for conservation" test. 139 Further, the Court ruled 
that financial costs cannot be considered in applying the Tulee test. 140 
The Tulee rule was again applied in Maison v. Confederated 
Tribes. 141 In a situation similar to the Makah case, three tribes 
brought suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Oregon Game Com-
mission regulations prohibiting fishing at traditional, off-reservation 
sites. The court, interpreting the "necessary for conservation" test, 
ruled that, while a regulation need only be reasonable to have effect 
against non-Indians, it must be "indispensable" to control Indian 
fishing.l42 The rules failed this requirement because Oregon could 
have achieved the same conservation results by limiting non-Indian 
sport fishing. Consequently, the court upheld an injunction against 
their enforcement. 143 
In an attempt to clarify the confusion surrounding the Tulee stan-
dard, the Supreme Court heard the case of Puyallup Tribe v. De-
partment of Game of Washington. 144 Once again, the affected Indian 
tribes sought equitable relief from a state game regulation, this time 
a prohibition on the use of set nets. For the first time, the Supreme 
Court squarely faced the issue of whether a state may regulate 
135 Id. at 225. 
136 Id. 
137Id. 
138 Id. at 226. 
139 Id. 
140 I d. at 225. 
141 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963). 
142 Id. at 174. 
143 Id. 
144 391 U.S. 392 (1968). Three Supreme Court opinions concerning the Puyallup tribe and 
the state of Washington came down within the space of ten years. These opinions will be 
referred to as Puyallup I, Puyallup II, and Puyallup III according to chronological order. 
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Indian off-reservation fishing. Justice Douglas, writing for a unani-
mous Court, began his analysis with an interpretation of the treaty 
clause "at all usual and accustomed places. "145 Because the clause 
mentions only the places in which fishing is done and not the way in 
which it is performed, the Court ruled that while a state may not 
prevent Indians from fishing at their accustomed grounds, it may 
impose controls on the manner of fishing and size of a take provided 
that any such regulation is "in the interest of conservation, . . . 
meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the 
Indians. "146 The Court was unclear about what the appropriate stan-
dard should be, but did seem to favor the "necessary for conserva-
tion" test.147 In doing so, it expressly rejected Maison's interpreta-
tion of necessary as meaning indispensible. 148 
The Puyallup I case signaled the end of litigation concerning the 
issue of whether a state has any power to regulate Indian off-res-
ervation fishing.149 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court left the door 
open for Indian advocates by ordering that "the issue of equal pro-
tection implicit in the phrase 'in common with '" must be addressed 
on remand. l50 As a result, the Indian tribes began to incorporate an 
equal protection argument into their suits against state fishing reg-
ulations. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
handled this argument in Sohappy v. Smith. 151 Rearticulating the 
standards of Puyallup I, the District Court held that state regulation 
of Indian fishing must "not discriminate against the Indians. "152 The 
Court found an institutional discrimination existed in the Oregon 
regulatory system for, while the state policies were meant to insure 
an equitable division between sport and commercial fishermen, the 
needs of Indian fishermen were ignored. l53 Therefore, in order to 
meet the non-discrimination requirement of Puyallup I, state re-
strictions must allow the treaty Indians to catch "a fair share" of 
harvestable fish. 154 
146Id. at 225. 
146 I d. at 398. 
147Id. at 398-40l. 
148 Id. at 401-02 n. 14. According to the Court, the indispensable standard should only be 
used where the regulation is revenue-producing, as in Tulee. The Malson opinion erred by 
applying the indispensable standard to a regulatory law. Id. 
14. For a strong criticism of the Puyallup I decision, see Johnson, supra note 4l. 
160 391 U.S. at 403. 
161 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Ore. 1969). 
162 Id. at 907. 
168 Id. at 910-11. 
164 Id. 
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The Supreme Court acknowledged Sohappy's "fair share" ap-
proach in Puyallup II.155 After the Puyallup I case was remanded, 
the Department of Fisheries removed its prohibition on net fishing 
for salmon. The Department of Game, however, continued to ban 
net fishing for steelhead. 156 Justice Douglas, noting that only Indian 
fishermen use set gill nets to catch steelhead, found that the regu-
lation essentially granted the entire run to sport fisherman. 157 This 
result, he concluded, discriminated against the treaty Indians. 158 
Therefore, the state must regulate fishing so that the steelhead runs 
are "in some manner fairly apportioned between Indian net fishing 
and non-Indian sports fishing . . . . "159 
The District Court case of United States v. Washington 160 provided 
the first chance to define the fair apportionment mandated by Puy-
allup II. In this case the United States, in its trustee role, sought 
a declaratory judgment concerning Indian fishing rights and injunc-
tive relief to provide enforcement of those rightS. 161 In an opinion 
thoroughly detailing all aspects of the controversy, Judge George 
Boldt ultimately determined that the Supreme Court's fair appor-
tionment standard required a fifty-fifty split of harvestable fish be-
tween Indian and non-Indian fishermen. 162 Judge Boldt determined 
this division based on the "in common with" language of the treaties. 
Since "in common with" is defined by the dictionary as sharing 
equally, the Indian tribes and the white fishermen should divide the 
harvestable fish equally. 163 
While such an approach has the merit of simplicity, the United 
States v. Washington decision recognized that the implementation of 
such a plan contained many snags. Primary among these was the 
definition of harvestable fish. Judge Boldt ruled that this figure did 
not include those fish caught by Indians for ceremonial purposes nor 
any fish required for spawning escapement. l64 Further, any appor-
156 Department of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. at 46-47. 
156 While salmon fishing is controlled by the Department of Fisheries, steelhead, considered 
a gamefish, are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Game. 
157 Department of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. at 46-47. 
158 I d. at 48. 
159Id. 
160 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 
U.S. 1086 (1976). 
161Id. at 327-28. 
162 I d. at 343. 
163 Id. The apportionment approach was soon adopted by an Oregon federal court. Sohappy 
v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1976). 
164 384 F. Supp. at 343. 
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tionment scheme would not include on-reservation fishing, which was 
immune from state regulation. 165 
Because the United States v. Washington decision heavily favored 
the Indian argument, resistance and outright defiance of its man-
dates were widespread. l66 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
with the exception of the desegregation cases, the United States v. 
Washington decision faced "the most concerted official and private 
efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this 
century. "167 In an attempt to calm the storm, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the case of Washington v. Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association. l68 The Court 
began its opinion by reiterating the requirement that the Indians 
must be given the right to harvest a share of all harvestable fish in 
any state management scheme. 169 Justice Stevens, writing the ma-
jority opinion, found this requirement to be inherent in the treaty 
guarantee of the "right of taking fish."170 The Court went on to 
determine the share to which the Indian tribes were entitled. In 
165 Id. This holding was rejected by the Supreme Court in Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game 
of Washington (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977). 
166 The Washington Supreme Court was partiCUlarly adamant. In Puget Sound Gillnetters 
Association v. Moos, 88 Wash.2d 677, 683-84, 565 P.2d 1151, 1154 (1977), the court sidestepped 
the United States v. Washington decision by finding that it had usurped legislative authority 
by requiring state agencies to act beyond the scope of their authority. I d. at 684-89, 565 P.2d 
at 1154-58. The equal protection clause offered another justification to ignore the United States 
v. Washington decision. In Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Associ-
ation v. Tollefson, 89 Wash.2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977), the Washington Supreme Court 
determined that a plan providing fifty percent of the anadromous resources to Indian tribes, 
which comprise less than one half of one percent of the entire state popUlation, "violate[dl the 
equal protection clause on its face." Id. at 281, 571 P.2d at 1376. The United States Supreme 
Court summarily rejected this equal protection argument in a footnote. Washington v. Wash-
ington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n. 20 (1979) 
("The simplest answer to this argument is that this Court... has repeatedly held that the 
peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally recognized status of Indians justifies special treat-
ment on their behalf .... "). The Court also specifically rejected the Moos holding. Id. at 695 
("It is also clear that [the Department of] Game and Fisheries ... may be ordered to ... imple-
ment the Court's interpretation of the rights of the parties even if state law withhold from 
them the power to do so."). 
167 Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th 
Cir. 1978). The state agencies charged with the duty of enforcing the United States v. 
Washington regulation promulgated regulations with great reluctance. These regulations were 
essentially meaningless, however, because the state seldom issued citations and even less 
frequently prosecuted the cited violations. Id. at 1128. The Moos decision subsequently 
stripped the state agencies of the power to enforce the United States v. Washington plan. 88 
Wash.2d at 677. 
168 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
169Id. at 679. 
17°Id. at 678 (emphasis in original). 
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accord with the United States v. Washington decision, the Court 
ruled that the "in common with" language entitled the Indians to 
harvest up to fifty percent of the fish.171 Nevertheless, this was to 
be a maximum, not a minimum allocation. The factor determining 
the actual allotment is the number of fish required to provide the 
Indians with "a moderate living. "172 Hence, if the number of tribal 
fishermen dwindles or the value of the product rises relative to the 
cost of living, the percentage allocated to the Indians can be accord-
ingly lowered. 173 
The Supreme Court also altered Judge Boldt's classification of 
harvestable fish. Salmon caught for ceremonial and religious needs 
were includable in the Indian fishermen's allocation.174 Fish caught 
at on-reservation sites were also included. 175 
v. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
A. Problems with the Status Quo 
Since the Washington Commercial Passenger case, the number of 
substantive court cases dealing with Indian fishing rights in the 
Pacific Northwest has dropped as courts attempt to implement ap-
portionment. 176 Superficial examination of the controversy, there-
fore, might lead to the conclusion that it is essentially solved. N one-
theless, fundamental defects still exist with the present solution. If 
171 I d. at 685. 
172 Id. at 686. 
173 This determination is to be made by federal district courts upon proper submission of 
interested parties. Id. at 686-87. 
174 Id. at 688. 
176Id. at 687. 
176 E.g., Washington State Charterboat Ass'n v. Baldridge, 702 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1983), 
cm. denied 464 U.S. 1053 (1984) (appeals court rejected sport fishing interest group's argu-
ment that an "aggregate" calculation of percentages be substituted for the standard run by 
run approach since the treaties guaranteed fifty percent of each run to the Indians). See also, 
Hoh Indian Tribe v. Baldridge, 522 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Wash. 1981); United States v. Adair, 
478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Ore. 1979). In United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. 
Wash. 1980), a federal district court determined that artificially propagated hatchery salmon 
must be included in allocation determinations. In addition, the court held that implicit in the 
treaty guarantees is the right to have the fishery habitat protected from man-made despoil-
ation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the first holding, but rejected the theory 
that the treaties gave the Indians an absolute right to relief from state-authorized degradation 
of salmon habitat. 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982) withdrawn for rehearing en bane, 704 F.2d 
1141 (9th Cir. 1983) aff'd on rehearing, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). See Comment, United 
States v. Washington (Phase II): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves Upstream" 12 ENVTL. 
L. 469 (1982). 
338 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:313 
left unattended, these problems will once again make Indian fishing 
rights an explosive controversy. 
In order to understand these problems, it is first necessary to 
comprehend the political context in which they fester. The white 
commercial and sport fishing interests are an important component 
of the state economy. For example, in Washington, approximately 
6,600 white commercial fisherman make their living on the harvest 
of salmon, taking over 80 percent of the entire catch. 177 In addition, 
283,650 sport fishermen contribute large sums to the state govern-
ment in the form of license fees. 178 Together, these user groups add 
$132 million to the state of Washington's economy each year. 179 As 
a result white fishermen exercise a powerful voice in state govern-
ment. 
In contrast, Indian fisherman have little power. Most Indians fish 
for subsistence; only a small minority are involved in commercial 
enterprises. ISO Treaty fishermen annually catch less than five percent 
of the entire run. 181 Further, the Indian tribes in general have tra-
ditionally been politically weak. l82 Victimized by racial prejudice and 
isolated both culturally and physically, the tribes often have little 
ability to protect their interests. Indeed, one commentator draws 
an analogy between the political voice of the black community and 
that of the Indian tribes. 183 
As a result of the relative political weakness of Indian fishermen 
compared to non-Indian fishing interests, an institutional bias has 
grown in state governments. Indeed, a long history of discrimination 
against Indian fishing exists in the Northwest states. During the 
1960s, state agencies pursued a vigorous policy aimed at denying 
Indian fishermen their rights. l84 Systematic harassment resulted in 
gear confiscation, fines, and jail sentences. l85 While the states ac-
177 United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 192 (W.D. Wash. 1980), modified, 694 
F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1982), withdrawn/or rehearing en bane, 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), af!'d 
on rehearing, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985). See also UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY, supra note 
1, at 126-29. 
178 Id. 
179 See EMPTY VICTORIES, supra note 26, at 426-27 n. 70. 
180 In the Yakima Indian Reservation, for instance, while 2,000 tribal members fish for 
subsistence, only 5 fish commercially. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 382. 
181 The tribal court in Puyallup I put the annual figure at between 3 and 5 percent annually. 
422 P.2d at 767. 
182 See Note, The Indian, The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1818 (1968). 
188 Id. at 1843. 
184 Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Friends Service Committee, at 9, Washington v. 
Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (No. 77-983). 
181iId. 
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tively encouraged the growth of white fisheries, the Indians were 
denied any form of assistance. 186 These actions led one tribesman to 
complain that "the State of Washington has deprived our people of 
a livelihood through harassment and restrictions in our accustomed 
fishing grounds . . . . "187 
It is in the context of this discrimination that the standards of 
Washington Commercial Passenger must be examined. The ultimate 
conclusion of the case is that the share of salmon allotted to the 
Indians must afford them a "moderate living."I88 Many possible stan-
dards exist to define this term. On the one hand, comparative per 
capita income provides a possible standard. Alternatively, a standard 
containing the historical living conditions, including tribal customs 
and traditions, would result in entirely different decisions. 
Certainly countless other manners of definition exist. Given the 
institutional bias against Indian fishing rights, it seems clear that 
the states will use the most restricted definition of the term. Hence, 
the vague language of the Washington Commercial Passenger rule 
will allow an outlet for states to impinge once again upon Indian 
fishing rights. 
Another defect of the present judicial approach lies in enforce-
ment. The Washington Commercial Passenger court ordered state 
agencies to draft rules in accordance with the apportionment order. 189 
Accompanying this order was a ruling which allowed the District 
Court to assume direct supervision over the fisheries. l90 Given the 
inherent state bias against Indian fishing rights, state agencies will 
be extremely reluctant to enforce judicial allowances,191 and the task 
of enforcing the allocations will fall on the federal district court 
judges. This is a role for which the judges, inexperienced in making 
scientific inquiries, are ill-suited. 192 Indeed, when Judge Boldt was 
forced to take over management of the western Washington fishery, 
he had only the part-time assistance of a college professor and an 
advisory council to make regulatory decisions which normally require 
the efforts of many dozens of field biologists. 193 The result was sub-
186 Brief of Respondent, Indian Tribes, at 51, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
187 [d. at 50-51. 
188 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
189 443 u. s. at 695. 
190 [d. 
191 See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. 
192 For a discussion of the inadequacies of judicial review of complex technical issues, see 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
193 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Northwest Steelhead and Salmon Council of Trout Unlimited, 
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stantial overfishing in many rivers.194 Thus, the judiciary's entrance 
into the regulation of anadromous fisheries merely poses another 
threat to the survival of salmon and steelhead. 
While the federal judges clearly lack the expertise to manage the 
fisheries, there is also a serious question whether it is their proper 
role. The judicial system has traditionally been wary of invading the 
powers vested in other branches by deciding political questions. The 
judicial system has taken a particularly restrained role in enforcing 
treaties because, as Justice Marshall explains, a "treaty addresses 
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature 
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the 
court."195 In other words, courts will generally not make affirmative 
judgments on how to implement a treaty; rather, the judiciary will 
only determine whether government action violates the treaty. 
When, however, the federal district court implements a fish alloca-
tion plan, it breaks this traditionl96 and as a result, usurps legislative 
powers. 197 
For the reasons stated above, neither the state governments nor 
the judicial system are fit to manage the fish resources of the Pacific 
Northwest. A better solution is to have Congress undertake this 
role. Congressional intervention into the issue has several advan-
tages. First, regulation by the federal government offers uniformity. 
Part of the problem in managing salmon and steelhead resources is 
their wide range of movement. On spawning runs, the anadromous 
species travel through the jurisdictions of several states and two 
nations, each with its own wildlife regulations. The resulting lack of 
coordination hampers attempts to maintain an adequate stock. In 
contrast, federal regulation would provide a uniform approach to the 
problem since any federal rule would take precedence over state 
lawsl98 and would be undeniably applicable to the Indian tribes. 199 
This uniformity will take on increased importance if the stock of 
salmon and steelhead continues to decline. 
at 17, Washington v. Washington Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) 
(No. 77-983). 
194 Id. at 18-19. 
195 Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). 
196 For a Supreme Court denunciation of such active judicial management in the realm of 
desegregation see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974). 
197 The result has been some embarrassingly vague opinions. See supra part IV. 
198 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. An example of federal oversight of the 
nation's wildlife resources is the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S. C.). 
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Second, a federal regulatory agency is in a better position to make 
objective determinations of the needs of both the anadromous species 
and all the user groups. Unlike state governments, federal agencies 
are more insulated from the voters. As a result, they are further 
removed from the strong external pressures felt by state agencies 
and will be less likely to engage in institutional discrimination. 
Finally, if the eventual survival of the anadromous species is con-
sidered, then the federal government needs to become involved. The 
pressures faced by the salmon and steelhead could ultimately lead 
to their extinction.2°O Easing these pressures requires costly en-
hancement programs such as the repurchase of fishing equipment 
and the creation of better means of circumnavigating dams. The vast 
financial resources of the federal government are best able to fill this 
need. 
B. Two Attempted Interventions 
Over the course of the fishing rights controversy, the federal 
government has generally avoided involvement, believing that the 
matter is properly handled on a local basis. Consequently, very little 
precedent exists for federal intervention. On two occasions, how-
ever, the United States has entered the field. 
The first case of federal intervention occurred not in the Pacific 
Northwest, but in the Great Lakes region. In 1979, a federal district 
court judge, citing canons of treaty interpretation, ruled that the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources may not regulate treaty-
based fishing rights of the Bay Mills Indians. 201 Alarmed at the 
potential harm to Great Lakes fish species, the Department of In-
terior quickly enacted a set of emergency regulations governing off-
reservation fishing.202 These rules contained provisions defining min-
imum mesh sizes for gill nets, areas closed to fishing, and fishing 
seasons for various species. Unfortunately, since the emergency 
regulations had a lifespan of just over one year,203 very little is known 
about their effectiveness in protecting fish resources. Nonetheless, 
l>JO In 1978, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service re-
quested public assistance in reviewing the status of salmon and steelhead populations of the 
upper Columbia in order to determine whether the species should be listed as threatened or 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act. 43 Fed. Reg. 45, 628 (1978). 
201 United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 281 (W.D. Mich. 1979). 
202 44 Fed. Reg 65,747 (1981). 
203 The regulations expired on January 1, 1981. 
342 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:313 
the rules could serve as a model for future regulation of Indian off-
reservation fishing. 204 
The federal government again intervened in the fishing rights 
controversy when Congress passed the Salmon and Steelhead Con-
servation and Enhancement Act in 1980.205 Unlike the Great Lakes 
regulations, the Act allowed the Department of the Interior to take 
a more restrained role in handling the dispute. Instead of placing 
the burden of enacting standards on the federal agency, the Act 
created the Salmon and Steelhead Advisory Commission, an entity 
composed of federal, state, and tribal officials, to prepare a compre-
hensive management plan. 206 The plan was to contain standards in 
accordance with nine stated objectives. The most important of these 
objectives were the prevention of overfishing, the coordination of 
management and enhancement activities by the various jurisdictions, 
and the optimizing of enforcement efforts.207 According to the act, 
the completed management plan was to be submitted to the Secre-
tary of Commerce, who in consultation with the Secretary of Inte-
rior, would determine whether it conformed with the stated objec-
tives. 208 If so, the Secretary was authorized to allocate funds for the 
implementation of qualified enhancement programs proposed by any 
group represented on the commission which obligated itself to en-
force the standards of the management plan. 209 The total sum allo-
cated to enhancement programs was $77 million.210 The Act autho-
rized an additional $37.5 million for the purchase of fishing vessels 
and licenses in order to lower demand. 211 
The Act seemed to provide a workable solution to the dispute. A 
presidential task force estimated that the enhancement programs, if 
fully implemented, would double the number of harvestable fish,212 
204 A related problem surrounding federal regulation is whether Congress ever authorized 
the Secretary of Interior to promulgate regulations concerning Indian off-reservation fishing. 
Although the Secretary enjoys a general supervisory power over Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 1.4 
(1985), this power does not include a "power to make rules governing Indian conduct" unless 
authorized by Congress. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. at 63. Congress has 
never specifically authorized Interior department regulation of off-reservation fishing. 
206 Pub. L. No. 96-51, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S. C.). 
206 [d. 
007 [d. at 3278. 
208 [d. 
209 [d. at 3279. The Act required enhancement proposals to contain certain elements such 
as an analysis of impact on fish populations and user groups, cost estimates, and data sup-
porting conclusions. [d. at 3782. 
210 [d. at 3283. 
211 [d. at 3285. 
212 H.R. Rep. No. 1243, pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 44 reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 11072. 
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thereby satisfying the needs of user groups to a greater extent and 
reducing concerns for species survival. Further, the concept of a 
joint state-tribal commission suggests the possibility of cooperation 
and negotiation between user groups which has been lacking to a 
large extent. Despite these positive features, the Act never had an 
opportunity to function. The Reagan Administration, as a cost-cut-
ting measure, allocated no funds for the enhancement programs and 
without such inducement, the Commission never produced a man-
agement plan. 213 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Indian off-reservation fishing controversy has developed out 
of the clash of two equally valid interests. The Indian tribes have a 
vested interest in preserving an ageless way of life guaranteed them 
by federal treaties. In contrast, the state governments are concerned 
with the continued existence of a wildlife resource. Resolution of the 
controversy lies not with federal and state judiciaries, but with the 
federal government. 
Under the present federal administration, such intervention into 
local affairs is discouraged. While this restrained approach may be 
understandable in some instances, it has no place in the controversy 
over Indian fishing rights. Federal intervention is required both to 
insure the Indian fishing rights guaranteed by treaty and to provide 
for effective management and for continued survival of the fish re-
source. These interests are certainly worthy of protection. 
213 Phone conversation with Mr. Robin Friedman, Attorney-Advisor, Department of Inte-
rior, Office of Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs (Nov. 14, 1985). 
